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T
HE theory of the demand for financial
assets has come in for a good deal of dis-
cussion in the last few years. Undoubtedly the
discussion has been fruitful and has given us
many new insights into the nature of financial
processes. But it cannot be said that there is
any generally agreed upon view as to the way in
which those processes work. It would be appro-
priate at a conference of this kind to review
the different hypotheses and give a systematic
summary of the present state of knowledge.
Unfortunately, though I have read the litera-
ture assiduously I have found it rather indi-
gestible.I do not feel prepared to give a fair
summary of other people's views.I must fall
back therefore on giving my own.
In this paper I shall deal with the demand
for liquid assets and money by households and
corporations. Those two groups hold over two-
thirds of all liquid assets, and the same general
approach though not the details can probably
be applied to the demands of unincorporated
businesses, farmers, state and local govern-
ments. In dealing with the demand for liquid
assets we must at least implicitly deal with the
demand for other types of assets, but I shall
not, except incidentally, say anything in detail
about the demand for stocks, bonds, or physical
assets. I shall confine myself to the demand for
currency, demand deposits, commercial bank
time deposits, mutual savings bank deposits,
savings and loan shares, savings bonds, and
short-term federal securities.There are, of
course, other liquid assets, but I shall have
little to say about them.
I have occasionally used the term money in
the sense of demand deposits and currency but
have usually referred to those assets specifically
to avoid any confusion with other definitions
of money. But though I am happy to try to
avoid the semantic confusion involved in argu-
ments about whether any particularasset
should be included under the heading money,
I do cling to the view that commercial bank
time deposits are significantly different from
demand deposits. For that matter, so is cur-
rency, and so perhaps we ought to dispense
with the term money in theoretical discussions
and say clearly what we mean.
In the first section of the paper I have dis-
cussed very briefly the conditions under which
liquid assets are supplied. There follow in sec-
tion 2adiscussion of corporate motives for
holding liquid assets and money and a review
of some empirical evidence on the relative im-
portance of various factors influencing cor-
porate decisions. In section 3, this theory of
household demand for liquid assets and money
is discussed together with some empirical evi-
dence.
The Supply of Liquid Assets
The major liquid assets today are cash,
short-termgovernmentsecurities,savings
bonds, and time deposits at commercial banks,
mutual savings banks, and savings and loan
associations.Various other assets, e.g., com-
mercial paper, supply some liquidity and, under
other circumstances, could supply more, but
we shall confine ourselves here to short gov-
ernments, savings bonds, and time deposits.
Savings bonds are, of course, on tap at fixed
yields and may be regarded as exogenously de-
termined.
The total volume of short-term Treasury
securities is determined by the Treasury (as-
suming thatit may affect conversionsifit
wishes). For theoretical purposes, we may re-
gard the composition of the federal debt as an
exogenous policy variable. The fact remains,
however, that there is some tendency for the
proportion of short-term issues outstanding to
rise in tight money periods and fall in easy
money periods.
If we are concerned with the determinants
of nonbank liquid asset holdings, then the
willingness of banks to switch maturities be-
comes important. In general, banks appear to
have been willing to switch out of very short
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maturities into somewhat longer ones in re-
sponse to changes in the yield curve. As a re-
sult, the supply of under-one-year maturities
to nonbank holders has considerable elasticity
in terms of yield spreads, though the supply
curve is certainly not flat.
The supply of savings deposits is a very
different matter from the supply of Treasury
bills and commercial paper. In the short run,
the supply of savings deposits is elastic at the
announced rates. In the long run (except when
the regulatory authorities interfere) the rate
offered by savings institutionsis related to
market rates and operating costs.For sav-
ings and loan associations, the relevant rates
are mainly those on conventional mortgages in
the areas where they operate. For mutual sav-
ings banks, yields on mortgages in their own
areas, on guaranteed mortgages in other areas,
and on bonds which they are eligible to buy are
relevant.If legal restrictions on rates did not
interfere, commercial bank time deposit rates
would presumably tend to reflect yields on
mortgages and municipal securities.
In the long run the differentials between sav-
ings deposit rates and those available on credit
market instruments depend not only on cost
factors in bank operations but also on the rela-
tive supplies of debt instruments of different
types. A large supply of mortgages tends to
raise savings institution yields relative to others
because those institutions have a comparative
advantage in handling mortgages.
If we are content with a partial analysis, the
above comments are perhaps sufficient. There
are, however, some additional considerations
affecting the availability of liquid assets. Let
us suppose that for some reason the public's
tastes change so that households collectively
wish to switch out of other assets into savings
deposits.Since savings institutions appear to
be willing to take all the deposits they can get
at the going rate, there appears to be no reason
why the public should not make the switch. But,
of course, that is not true. If the yield spreads
existing when tastes change are to persist, the
savings institutions must not only be willing to
take deposits but they must also be willing to
buy the assets from which the public wants to
switch (if we rule out asset expansion by banks).
If the public wished to sell a set of assets having
the same relative composition as the existing
portfolios of savings institutions, there is no
reason why the switch should not take place.
But suppose the public wished to sell stocks
and take savings deposits. They cannot sell the
stocks to savings institutions. In the end the
stocks must remain in the hands of holders
other than savings institutions.If the initial
holders come to like stocks less, their prices
must falluntil the original or some other
holders other than savings institutions are will-
ing to hold them. That change in yields may
set up repercussions which will result in some
increase in savings deposits (and the shifting
of some assets to savings institutions).But
even when the yields offered by savings institu-
tions are a fixed function of yield on credit mar-
ket instruments, the public cannot trade freely
between savings deposits and other assets at
fixed yields.'
We cannot properly analyze the forces in-
fluencing the volume of savings deposits in
partial equilibrium supply and demand terms.
Those forces work themselves out through the
whole system of interrelated supplies and de-
mands for different kinds of assets.
Corporate Holdings of Money
and Other Liquid Assets
In this section we shall consider the factors
influencing the total amount of liquid assets
held by corporations and the division of those
assets between cash and interest-bearing forms
of liquidity. We start from the assumption that
the decision-making process involves first a
decision about the amount of liquid assets to
be held and then a decision about the propor-
tion to be held in cash.
We begin with a brief outline of the rationale
for holding liquid assets and then consider in
equally general terms the rationale of the
choice between cash and other liquid assets.
We then turn to the empirical problem of ex-
plaining observed movements of liquid assets.
We first review some work which seems to
explain the short-term cyclical movements of
Of course, the public's holdings of stocks will in the
long run be affected by a change in tastes because changes
in the yields of stocks relative to other assets will influence
the composition of corporate security issues and the corn-
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liquidity positions during the postwar period,
and then consider the trend of liquidity posi-
tions in the postwar period. Finally there are
some rather sketchy comments on liquidity
movements in the twenties and thirties.
We then turn to the problem of explaining
observed movements in the division of liquidity
between cash and other forms of liquidity.
Once again, we begin with the postwar period
and then proceed to comment briefly on the
events of earlier periods.
Business Demand for Liquidity.
Corporate treasurers wish to have liquid as-
sets on hand for a variety of reasons.First,
some minimum of liquid assets is required to
cover the day-to-day variations in receipts and
expenditures without continually borrowing
and repaying bank loans.Second, many cor-
porations have wide seasonal variations in their
cash inflows and outflows. Some choose to bor-
row from banks during seasons when cash out-
flows exceed inflows and repay when the bal-
ance of the flows turns the other way. Others,
however, raise enough from long-term sources
to cover all or part of their seasonal cash out-
flows, and therefore have surplus liquidity
during the seasons of net cash inflow. In doing
that they make an interest sacrifice which de-
pends on the relations between the cost of long-
term funds, the cost of bank borrowing, and
the yield on liquid assets.2
Third, most, though not all, business firms
seem to feel that it is desirable to fund all or
a very large part of their tax liability. A so-
phisticated treasurer may feel that he need
only be prepared to meet the net reduction in
tax liability which will occur when profits de-
cline, but most of them do not appear to take
that view.
Fourth, most firms wish to have liquidity to
meet the problems arising from a decline in
cash flow from current operations during a de-
pression. In a depression a firm must be able
to draw down liquid assets or borrow to meet
the cumulative difference between net cash
flow from operations and the sum of (i) debt
'In return for that cost they reduce the risk of being
burdened with short-term debt during a business decline
and reduce the cost of long-term borrowing by improving
the current ratio.
service (2) dividends aminimum level of
investment.It should be noted that net cash
flow from operations can become negative be-
cause, in order to maintain its market share,
a firm is willing to continue production when
average variable cost exceeds price.
Itis not, of course, strictly necessary to
maintain dividends in periods of adversity, but
it is clear that many firms are willing to bear
some cost in order to do so.
Investment will, of course, decline to a low
level during a depression but, even when there
is a great deal of excess capacity, certain in-
vestments can be avoided only at great cost.
Those investments include replacements nec-
essary to maintain production, and investments
required to adapt to changing market condi-
tions.In addition, technical developments or
the possibility of buying out financially weak
competitors may present investment opportu-
nities promising very high returns.
A firm always has the possibility of financing
those cash requirements by borrowing, but in
a depression lenders may not be disposed to
gamble on the firm's prospects.If they are
willing to lend they may require some measure
of control or impose restrictions on the bor-
rower's action.
To avoid or reduce borrowing under adverse
conditions, a firm can raise more long-term
capital than it needs for current outlays, dur-
ing periods when it can do so advantageously,
and build up a stock of liquidity against ad-
versity.It then pays the difference between
the cost of long-term funds and return on liquid
assets (less the cost of borrowing avoided dur-
ing periods of adversity). The cost may be
somewhat reduced because the improvement in
its current ratio will reduce the cost of its
long-term borrowing.
In all the cases so far mentioned, the firm
gains in convenience and reduction of risk by
paying more in interest charges than would
otherwise be necessary, and the amount of
liquidity maintained will be determined at the
point where the marginal gains are balanced
by the costs of obtaining additional liquidity.
That implies, of course, that the amount of
liquidity held by the firm will (other things
equal) tend to increase as long-term capital12 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
costs fall relative to the yields on Treasury bills
or other short-term investments.
We should, of course, expect business liquid-
ity at a given phase of the business cycle to
be roughly scaled to the volume of sales or total
receipts and payments —withthe proportion-
ality factor varying with interest rate differ-
entials.Since risk is involved, we should ex-
pect firms to hold less liquidity as they become
more confident of the stability of the economy
and to increase liquidity ratios with a deterio-
ration of confidence. Finally, the level of cor-
porate income tax rates and the length of the
collection lag should influence the volume of
liquid assets held.
Before going on to review some empirical
evidence on these propositions, it is necessary
to introduce some other considerations.
The variation in corporate liquidity over the
cycle reflects some "mechanical" aspects of
cash inflows and cash outflows. Firms that do
not rely heavily on bank financing will tend to
have certain passive inflows and outflows of
cash (which may be shifted into other forms
of liquid assets). To put it another way, firms
may have certain target levels of liquid assets
but they do not always eliminate discrepancies
between actual and target levels very rapidly.
During recovery years, like 1955 and 1959,
corporations tend to gain liquidity because
profits rise rapidly while tax payments lag.
Fixed investment appropriations rise rapidly
but actual outlays rise more slowly.Inven-
tories and receivables also rise but a consider-
able part of the increase is bank financed. The
result is a large net cash inflow. Firms gaining
liquidity in this way could pay off long-term
debt, but have little incentive to do so since
they are committed to higher investment out-
lays in the near future and will also have larger
tax payments to make.
In the later years of the cycle, retained earn-
ings and depreciation level off, tax payments
catch up, and the rate of investment outlays
catches up with new appropriations for in-
vestment. Some of the liquidity gained earlier
is then disgorged.
The record in slump years is mixed. Cor-
porations lost liquidity in 1954 and 1960 but
gained in 1958. The difference appears t.o be
due in part to (i) differences in the relative
changes in profits and tax payments arising
from changes in the tax law, (2)differencesin
the magnitude of inventory reduction, dif-
ferences in the magnitude of the change in
plant and equipment investment.
Corporate Demand for Demand Deposits.
Corporate demand for demand balances has
to be explained in terms of the rationale of the
choice between demand balances and other
types of liquid assets which earn interest —
inthis case, mainly Treasury bills.
As in the case of households, a substantial
part of corporate liquidity is held to cover
fairly near-term net cash outflows arising from
the uneven rates of receipts and expenditures.
The gross return to be obtained from holding
Treasury bills depends on the amounts in-
volved, the interest rate, and the length of the
holding period. The gross return is offset by
the transactions cost of going into and out of
bills —dealerspread and any other direct
costs.However, dealer spreads on bills are
very low so that the direct cost of transactions
in bills can be earned by holding bills for very
short periods even at low interest rates.
However, the direct costs of transactions are
only part of the cost of holding Treasury bills.
If bills are held only for a few definite, large
out payments —e.g.,tax payments —theonly
additional cost is a little thought on the part of
the treasurer. But as soon as a firm embarks
on a program of trying to earn interest by pre-
dicting cash inflows and outflows, and investing
temporary excess funds, it has to bear some
overhead costs to keep track of its cash posi-
tion.
In entering on a program of investing short-
term surpluses of funds and in deciding how far
to carry it, a firm must balance the expected
average return from its bill holdings (or an
increment in them) against the overhead cost
of controlling its cash position. The expected
return will vary with the average rate of inter-
est on bills expected over a period of years.
The cost will vary with the tightness of the
cash management. As we pass from simple op-
erations such as funding tax liabilities to the
very close cash management practiced by a few
large companies, the cost of increasing the
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scale) by closer management will rise.The
cost per dollar invested will rise as the scale
of the firm becomes smaller. We should ex-
pect, therefore, that at low interest rates only
large firms will use Treasury billsfor any
purpose other than funding tax liabilities, and
even the large firms may not find very close
cash management worthwhile. A rise in inter-
est rates should push out both the extensive
(size of firm) and intensive (closeness of cash
management) margins and cause a shift from
cash to bills. However, since the costs of cash
management are mainly overhead costs, we do
not expect much shifting between cash and
bills in response to short-run fluctuations in
bill rate. Instead, we expect shifts in response
to changes in the average rate expected for a
period of years —probablybest measured by
a fairly long moving average of past rates.
Moreover, some of the costs are costs of getting
started and learning the tricks of cash man-
agement, so that a rise in bill rates may result
in a shift from cash to bills. A later fall (even
on a long-term basis) may not bring the cash-
bill ratio back to its initial position.
Shifting from cash to interest-bearing liquid
assets is not the only way to reduce cash bal-
ances in relation to activity.Close attention
to cash management may enable a firm to re-
duce its operating cash without any investment.
For example, measures to speed up processing
and collection of checks may reduce the float
of unavailable cash. There are many examples
of this sort.It is not clear whether develop-
ments of this sort represent a response to
changing interest rates or whether they are
simply improvements in managerial techniques
which, like other changes in techniques, occur
even when no factor price has changed. One
would expect, however, that enthusiasm for
measures to reduce the need for cash would
increase with rising interest rates.It should
be noted that increased efficiency in the use of
operating cash is likely to reduce total liquidity
and to affect cash directly so that the share of
cash in total liquidity will fall.
Corporate managements also appear to have
achieved some reduction in their cash balances
in relation to activity by sharper negotiation
with banks.It is customary for corporations
holding payroll, dividend, or other accounts in-
volving a large volume of check processing to
maintain an average balance on which the bank
can earn a return (in lieu of a service charge),
which covers the costs of servicing the account.
In recent years, a good many corporations
which do not depend on bank loan finance have
tried systematically to hold these balances down
to a minimum. But, so long as the custom of
remunerating banks by holding balances rather
than by explicit service charges continues, a
substantial amount of corporate funds will be
tied up in this way.
Short-Run Movements in Total Liquidity.
In discussions of the demand for money and
liquid assets, attention is usually centered on
the elasticity of demand for liquid assets with
respect to interest rates. In fact, however, the
variation in corporate liquid asset holdings over
the business cycle is principally due to varia-
tions in the cash flows from operations. Cash
flows are generated by retained earnings, plant
and equipment outlays, increases or decreases
in inventory and variables, tax accounts and tax
payments. The net balance of those flows —
eachof which has a large cyclical variation —
isfirst reflected in corporate liquid asset hold-
ings. Managements then have to decide whether
the resulting liquidity position is too high or
too low with respect to some target.If the
liquidity position is out of line with this target
position, firms must then raise funds from out-
side sources or repay debt.
Interest rates may enter this picture in two
ways. On the one hand, target levelsof
liquidity may be influenced by the cost of
holding liquidity, as indicated above. On the
other hand, even if target levels are not affected
by interest costs, the timing of borrowing may
be influenced by cyclical movements in the
interest rate.
Following this reasoning, we may treat liquid
asset holdings as an inventory and explain
movements in liquidity in terms of a stock
adjustment process of the same type used in
explaining physical inventories.
This has been done by Locke Anderson
in a paper presented to the Econometric So-
ciety. Briefly, his results can be interpreted as
follows.
i.Targetlevels of liquid asset holdings ap-14 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
pear to depend on sales and tax liability, with
the desired holdings of liquidity equal to about
15 per cent of annual sales and 6o per cent of
tax liability.
2,Theamount of outside funds raised in a
quarter (for a given position in terms of other
variables mentioned below) increases by about
2forevery dollar of increase in the difference
between actual and target liquid asset holdings
at the start of the quarter. That is, firms act
as though they tried to close the gap between
actual and target holdings in about a year.
3.Borrowingin a given quarter also responds
to changes in cash flows from retained earnings
and depreciation, plant and equipment expendi-
tures, and inventories and receivables. Short-
term borrowing declines by about 75 per cent
of any increase in retained earnings, but the
response of borrowing to cash flows of the other
types is much weaker. As a result, an increase
in the rate of inventory investment will reduce
liquid assets, and vice versa.
4. The rate of borrowing is also significantly
influenced by the debt position of corporations.
5. Finally the rate of long-term borrowing is
significantly influenced by the corporate bond
yield. A one percentage point increase in the
bond yield appears to reduce corporate bor-
rowing by $700 million per quarter.If all
other flow variables remained constant while
the bond yield rose, the result would be a de-
cline in borrowing followed by a gradual rise
as the liquidity stock was reduced. A one-time
rise in the interest rate would result in a one-
time reduction in the liquidity stock. However,
there are some indications that the relevant in-
terest rate variable is not the absolute rate but
some indicator of the cyclical position of the
rate. That view is supported by the fact that
the bill rate did not appear to have any signifi-
cant influence on borrowing. Since the cost of
liquidity is the difference between bill and bond
yield, it seems probable that the interest rate
coefficient represents a timing variable rather
than a variable affecting the long-term level of
liquidity.
Anderson's results are supported not only by
aggregate regressions for all manufacturing but
also by separate analysis of a number of manu-
facturing industries. They seem to show, first,
that the bulk of the variation in corporate
liquidity is explained by variations in operating
cash flows. Second, they do show that the in-
terest rate can have a very substantial short-
run effect on corporate borrowing but leave it
uncertain whether the upward trend in interest
rates plays a significant role in determining the
trend of corporate liquidity.
POSTWAR TREND IN TOTAL LIQUIDITY. We
need not give any account of movements of
corporate liquidity in the years immediately
after the war. It seems reasonable to take the
view that most corporations had made their
basic adjustment to postwar conditions by
about 1952. Since that time there has been a
downward trend in the ratio of corporate liquid
asset holdings to GNP and to corporate sales.
Part of the declineis probably due to
the decline in the ratio of tax liabilities to
corporate sales as a result of the decline in
profit margins and the shortening of the lag
between accrual and payment. The ratio of
liquidassets,lesstaxliabilities,tosales
shows almost no decline. However, it is going
too far to offset tax liabilities against liquidity,
one for one. We know that some corporations
borrow at tax dates so they cannot have fully
funded their tax liability. Some corporations
have less total liquidity than their tax liability,
so it is obvious that they cannot have done so.
Anderson's research suggests about 6o per cent
funding as a norm, If that figure or one some-
where near it is used, then the ratio of corporate
liquidity to GNP (adjusted for the tax factor)
fell from about .11 in 1952, to .09 Ifl 1960 and
1961. The downward drift in the relative hold-
ings of cash, governments, and time deposits
may have been offset by an increase in holdings
of various other liquid assets not included in
our figures, but those other assets cannot have
increased enough to offset the downward trend
in relative holdings of the ones included.
To what should we attribute the decline?
Even if we took Anderson's results with respect
to the interest rate at face value, we would
expect to get a decline in liquidity of less than
i per cent of GNP from the 1952—61 rise in
BAA bond yields. Moreover, the net cost of
holding liquidity has increased very little be-
cause the average spread between bill and bond
yields has changed relatively little.Rising in-THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
terest rates may have had some effect on the
trend of liquidity ratios, but it seems doubtful
that it has been very large.
Three other factors have probably played a
role:(i) improved cash management, partly
as a result of higher interest rates but also
simply as a part of the general and continuing
effort to reduce costs; (2) improved confidence
in the stability of the economy may have in-
duced some firms to reduce holdings of liquidity
for protective purposes;(3) some firms still
had "excessive" liquidity in 1952 and have
worked it off since.
I know of no way to measure the influence of
these factors but it seems unlikely that more
than a fraction of the decline in liquidity ratios
is due to changes in interest costs.
Liquidity in the Twenties Compared with Post-
war Liquidity.
The ratio of corporate liquidity to GNP dur-
ing the 1920'S stood at about .14 until 1928,
when it rose sharply to .17,returningto about
.15 at the end of 1929. The ruling ratio during
the twenties was higher than that ruling in 1952
(after adjustment for tax liability). Moreover
liquidity ratios showed no downward trend
during the twenties. The rise at the end of the
twenties is probably due to the large volume of
stock issues in 1928 and 1929, and the rise
would be even larger if corporate holdings of
call loans were included in the ratio.
The net cost of holding liquidity has prob-
ably not increased significantly between the
twenties and the fifties.Indeed (leaving call
loans aside) it has probably decreased because
of income tax and the availability of Treasury
bills. It does not seem reasonable to arguethat
people have become more confident about in-
come stability now than they were in the twen-
ties. We can conclude, it seems to me, that the
difference in liquidity ratios between the two
periods is due to factors other than confidence or
the cost of liquidity. It is hardly surprising that
changesinthecompositionofoutput,in
methods of financing, in the concentration of
industry, should have produced some substan-
tial changes in liquidity ratios.
It seems unlikely that, interest costs aside,
practices with respect to liquidity should fol-
low simple and immutable laws over long
periods.
Liquidity Movements in the Great Depression.
Corporate liquidity rose relative to GNP
from the already high level in 1929 to 1932 and
1933.Thereafter liquidity ratios fell slowly,
but even at the beginning of World War lithe
ratio of corporate liquid asset holdings to GNP
was .16. With some allowance for corporate
tax liability, the corporate liquidity ratio in
1941 was near the level of the 1920's.
It seems probable that most of the swing in
liquidity during the thirties was attributable to
the confidence factor. Firms preferred to hold
on to liquid assets in the early thirties rather
than pay back debt, because the chance that
economic conditions would deteriorate was
taken very seriously. With recovery, firms per-
mitted liquidity ratios to decline gradually. The
movements of liquidity ratios conform much
more closely to one's guess about the state of
business confidence than to the variations in
the net interest cost of holding liquidity.
Cash Versus Other Forms of Liquid Assets in
the Postwar Period.
In the years since 1952, corporate cash hold-
ings have increased slowly and steadily, while
holdings of governments have shown little trend
and have varied from year to year in a range
of about $3 billion. Another set of regression
studies by Anderson suggests that most of the
short-term variations in liquidity positions are
reflected in holdings of government securities,
while cash positions respond much more weak-
ly to those factors.It is easy to understand
that,ifa firm has an improvement inits
liquidity position as a result of a cyclical swing
in earnings and finds it inconvenient to repay
debt, it will invest the surplus. When the cash
flow picture reverses, it will not have any sur-
plus cash because of its previous action and will
have to sell bills if it does not borrow. In spite
of a number of efforts to do so, I believe no one
has found a statistically significant relationship
between short-term variations in bill yields and
the distribution of corporate liquidity between
cash and governments. That is to be expected
in view of the considerations with respect to
overhead costs given above.i6 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
It does not follow that the trend in the ratio
of cash to other forms of liquidity has not been
influenced by interest rates.The share of
liquidity in the form of time deposits (though
still small) has risen since 1952, and that can
probably be attributed to interest rates (though
the willingness of banks to take corporate time
deposits is also a factor).
The ratio of government security holdings
to cash holdings has fallen since 1952 but, if
we make allowance for the large proportion of
governments held against tax liability, the ratio
of cash to total liquidity has fallen fromto
72 per cent. That is a relatively small decline
and does not constitute very impressive evi-
dence of a large-scale switch from cash to bills.
The proportion of liquid assets held in the
form of cash is of course influenced by other
factors. An increase in efficiency in the use of
operating cash works to reduce the ratio of cash
to liquid assets. On the other hand, a reduction
in protective liquidity resulting from a gain in
confidence should tend to reduce bills relatively
more than cash.
There is room, therefore, for some switch
from cash to Treasury securities and time de-
posits, but there is no evidence that rising inter-
est rates have produced a strong swing to
interest-bearing forms of liquidity or that rising
interest rates have accounted for a large part
of the reduction in the ratio of corporate cash
to sales and GNP.
Cash Versus Other Forms of Liquidity in the
Prewar Period.
The ratio of corporate cash to total liquid
assets rose slightly in the early years of the de-
pression and then after 1933 rose to nearly 8o
per cent of total liquidity. The shift must, I
think, be put down to the very low levels of
interest rates on time deposits and short-term
government securities ruling in the late thirties.
The ratio of corporate cash to total liquidity
in the 1920's was higher than in the postwar
period but, after adjustment of postwar data
for tax liabilities, the cash liquidity ratio in the
twenties was slightly higher than the one ruling
in the postwar period.
The differences are not great enough to call
for extended comment except to note that the
development of Treasury bills does not, seem
to have had a great effect on the distribution of
corporate liquidity.
Household Demand for Liquid Assets and Money
Demand for Liquid Assets.
Personal motives for holding liquid assets —
transactionsand precautionary motives, liquid-
ity preferences, risk avoidance —areall so
familiar that it is not necessary to discuss them
in any detail. Just as in the corporate case, an
individual who holds liquid assets takes a re-
duction in expected yield on his portfolio in
return for a reduction in risk and inconven-
ience. The loss in expected yield depends on
the price difference between the expected yields
of variable assets —realestate, stocks, long-
term bonds —andthe yields on liquid assets.
Just as in the corporate case, we expect that,
other things equal, the amount of liquid assets
an individual will wish to hold will decline as
the cost of holding them increases. We also
expect that increased confidence in the future
stability of income will reduce the demand for
liquid assets, and vice versa. An increase in the
variance of the expected performance of vari-
able price assets will increase the demand for
liquid assets, while a decrease will reduce it.
Some of the reasons for holding liquid assets
are related to uncertainties or unevenness in
the flow of receipts and expenditures. On that
account we might expect the demand for liquid
assets to increase, other things equal, with the
level of permanent income. But liquid assets
are also required in an optimum portfolio even
when there is no problem of income or expendi-
ture variation.Other things equal, then, we
should expect the demand for liquid assets to
grow with both the level of income and the level
of assets.
In individual portfolio management the size
of the portfolio has an important influence on
the proportion of assets held in liquid form.
That is so for two reasons. Since borrowing is
costly and inconvenient, most people wish to
hold enough liquid assets to provide for short-
term variations in income and expenditure.
Persons whose total financial assets are small
in relation to their incomes will find it advan-
tageous to hold all their assets in liquid form.
Second, asset management is an activity withTHE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
decreasing costs to scale. The cost in terms oi
cash and effort of choosing assets subject to
risk is much smaller per dollar invested for a
large portfolio than for a small one. The net
gain to be obtained from buying variable price
securities as opposed to savings deposits of one
type or another is not likely to be worth the
trouble for the holder of a relatively small
portfolio.
It seems probable that a substantial volume
of liquid assets is held in connection with asset
transfers.Individuals who sellmarketable
securities or real estate may hold funds pend-
ing reinvestment for periods ranging from a
few days to several months. In some cases they
may go liquid because they are bearish on var-
iable price assets generally.But itis very
common for people to sell a particular asset
because they consider its net yield prospects
unsatisfactory without having chosen another
asset. They will hold liquid assets until they
find a satisfactory alternative investment. We
have no idea what volume of assets is tied up
in this way but it may be very substantial.
Finally, there appears to be an interchange
between strictly fixed-price assets —demand
deposits, currency, savings deposits, and sav-
ings bondsand assets with low credit risk
and price variability, particularly high grade
bonds. Individuals who have sufficient liquid
assets to take care of short-term variations in
income and expenditure may wish to have addi-
tional low-risk assets in their portfolio which
they expect to hold for a fairly long time. The
fact that savings deposits of various types can
be converted to cash at any time with no trans-
actions cost is of relatively little significance if
one plans to hold an asset for a long time. Price
variability is of some significance but those who
plan to hold to maturity, anyway, need not give
it a very heavy weight.Savings deposits of
various types are therefore close substitutes for
high quality bonds, particularly those with only
moderately long maturities.
On that basis we should expect that, during
periods when market yields on bonds are low
relative to time-deposit rates, the flow of house-
hold funds into bonds would be relatively low
and the flow into time deposits relatively high.
Conversely, when bond yields rise relative to
time-deposit yields, we should expect household
bond purchases to rise relative to household
takings of time deposits.
Of course the competitive relationship be-
tween time deposits and bonds is not just a
cyclical phenomenon. The relative levels of
time deposit yields and bond yields over the
whole cycle will influence the division of in-
dividual portfolios. But because time deposit
yields move slowly relative to market yields
over the cycle (though linked in the long run to
market yields), the cyclical influence of bond—
time deposit substitution is much more appar-
ent than any long-run substitution.
LIQUID ASSETS AND EXPENDITURE. A number
of writers have expressed the view that varia-
tions in household holdings of liquid assets have
a strong influence on the rate of consumer ex-
penditure. The rationale of that view has never.
been entirely clear to me.
It seems reasonable to expect that an increase
in the real net worth of the household sector
might tend to reduce saving and increase con-
sumption.If people are saving in order to
accumulate assets for some particular purpose,
the desire to save may wane as they approach
their goal.Of course, they may discover or
recognize new goals for accumulation as they
satisfy old ones, so it remains an empirical
question whether an increase in net worth or
in the ratio of net worth to income actually
depresses saving.
But why should the possession of liquid as-
sets, as distinguished from other assets, have a
special effect on saving? One does not come
any closer to any goal for accumulation by
holding a deposit in a savings institution than
by holding an equivalent amount of stocks and
bonds.
The only difference seems to be that one can
convert liquid assets into cash more easily and
quickly than other kinds of assets.Conse-
quently, one can give in to impulses to spend
more easily if one holds liquid assets than if
one holds other kinds of assets. There is some
plausibility in that argument, but it obviously
only applies to a limited part of the variation in
liquid assets. The impulse consideration does
not apply to persons who save regularly a sub-
stantial proportion of income or to persons who
always have a substantial liquid position. For
reasons which I will indicate below it seemsi8 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
likely thatexcept for the war and early
postwar periods —mostof the variation in
liquid asset holdings is in the holdings of high
income, high asset holders. In that case it is
unlikely that cyclical variations in liquid asset
holdings have much to do with variations in
saving.
Demand for Money.
In the last section we discussed the demand
for liquid assets as a group without any distinc-
tion between money and other liquid assets.
We must now turn to the question why people
hold part of their liquid assets in noninterest-
bearing demand deposits and currency. It should
be noted at the outset that, in the literature, the
reasons given in the last section for holding
liquid assets are often given as reasons for
holding demand deposits and currency. That
may have been appropriate in periods when
other forms of virtually riskless, readily mar-
ketable assets were not generally available.
But it is not a satisfactory answer nowadays.
The demand for currency and demand deposits
must be analyzed, first, in terms of choices be-
tween liquid and nonliquid assets and, second,
in terms of choices between currency and de-
mand deposits and other forms of liquid assets.
DEMAND FOR CURRENCY. The total amount
of currency outstanding since the war has
varied between $25 and $30 billion. Estimates
made by the Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors suggest that about one-third of this amount
is in business hands and the rest either in the
hands of households, lost, destroyed, or gone
abroad. It is fairly obvious that the bulk of the
currency in nonbusiness hands is not being used
for pocket money or being carried around by
people who do not have bank accounts. The
amount of currency not in business hands rep-
resents nearly a month's wages for the entire
labor force.Over half of American families
have checking accounts and some of the re-
mainder deposit pay checks in savings accounts
and withdraw currency and registered checks
as needed. Moreover, the bulk of the families
who do not use bank accounts receive wages
weekly. A full week's wages for one part of
the families and an average of a couple of
hundred dollars for the rest —whichseems a
generous estimateevenafterallowingfor
travelers —willnot account for as much as $io
billion of currency.
Some of the remainder is, no doubt, lost,
destroyed, or gone abroad. The rest must be in
hoards for some special reason. These would
include currency used in illegal transactions or
held by small businessmen and professionals
who receive currency and hold part of it to
evade taxes, and hoarded savings of farmers
who saved during the war and distrusted banks.
The amount of currency outstanding nearly
doubled during the depression and rose by a
factor of about four during the war. After the
war itfell slightly until 1950 and has risen
slowly since then by nearlybillion.It should
be noted that the amount of currency outstand-
ing showed little trend in years from 1900 to
1914, rose sharply during World War I, and
then remained more or less stationary during
the twenties.
If currency were used only for transaction
purposes, we should expect the amount out-
standing to rise with income but at a slower
rate because of the increasing use of checking
accounts,registeredchecks,the spreadof
check-cashing facilities, and the increased use
of credit cards. We might also expect that
currency held for tax evasion and illegal activi-
ties would grow with the scale of the economy
—ifthe incentives for tax evasion do not
change much.
On the other hand, it is likely that special
factors connected with war resulted in the gen-
eration of abnormally high levels of hoarding
relative to income and tax rate levels.The
gradual liquidation of some of those wartime
hoards may be offsetting the other factors tend-
ing to make the currency outstanding to grow.
That position gains some support from the fact
that the currency grew rapidly during World
War I and then leveled off during the twenties,
even though income grew. The rate of liquida-
tion of currency hoards other than those con-
nected with tax evasion or illegal activities may
have been speeded up by the rise in interest
rates, but we have no real information on that
point.
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR DEMAND DEPOSITS.
We can approach the analysis of the demand for
demand deposits by asking why a man, given
that he has some liquid assets, should hold themTHE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
in a form which yields no interest. Certainly a
major part of the answer lies in the fact that
checking accounts are more convenient than
other liquid assets and that funds left with
savings institutions for short periods yield no
return or a very small one.
Persons who hold liquid assets against a cer-
tain or fairly probable excess of payments over
receipts in the near future will not find the return
from savings deposits or savings bonds worth
the trouble of converting from cash to earn-
ing assets and back again unless the amounts
involved are very large. The income transac-
tions demand for money will certainly account
for some substantial amount of personal de-
mand deposits. As the savings deposit interest
rate rises, the proportion of "transient" liquid
assets held in the form of demand deposits
should decline.
The full theory of an optimum demand de-
posit inventory policy is just as complex as any
other kind of inventory policy, but a simple
example suffices to make the point in question.
Suppose we consider only the disposition of
liquid assets held against known lump-sum out-
payments to be made at known dates and
which cannot be financed out of expected net
cash inflows in the intervening period. A sum
of pdollarsheld for m months yields the holder
pXXr dollars (when r is the yield on sav-
ings deposits neglecting compounding). If an
individual requires a given dollar return to
make worthwhile one round trip from cash to
savings deposit and back to cash, the size of
the payment pandthe length of the interval in
required to earn that amount of dollars ob-
viously becomes shorter as r rises. When in-
terest rates are low, savings deposits will be
held only against large distant payments. As
interest rates rise, people will hold savings
deposits against smaller nearer-term payments
which will produce a shift from demand bal-
ances to savings accounts.
It is unlikely, however, that the bulk of per-
sonal demand deposits are held for income
transactions purposes. On January 31 (which
is about the low point of the year for indi-
vidual deposits), banks' records show that 85
per cent of personal demand deposit accounts
had less than $i,ooo, but those accounts had
only about 30 per cent of the total amount of
personal demand deposits.Since the larger
holders have more than one account, it is prob-
able that the remaining 14 per cent of the ac-
counts were held by no more than io per cent
of the persons holding demand deposit ac-
counts. And since nearly half of families have
no demand deposit account it must be con-
cluded that aboutper cent of families own
70 per cent of personal demand deposits.
Moreover, half the personal demand deposits
are in accounts of over
No doubt some part of the relatively large
deposits is required for income transactions.
But it seems probable that a large proportion
of the larger personal demand deposit accounts
is held in connection with financial transac-
tions.
At a rough guess, individual purchases and
sales of stocks, bonds, real estate, and other
assets amount to something like $ioo billion
per year.An average holding period —be-
tween sale of one asset and purchase of an-
other —ofabout four months would tie up
over $30 billion.If half that sum were in
demand deposits, billion would be ac-
counted for.I have no way of testing what
amounts are tied up in asset float, but it seems
probable that they are a significant part of
personal demand deposits.
Now any individual who sells an asset and
plans to reinvest in nonliquid assets, at a time
some distance in the future or at an unspeci-
fied time, has the option of keeping his funds
in a demand deposit or obtaining interest from
a time deposit. Persons who plan to hold for
periods less than a month cannot get interest
from time deposits generally, and people in
high tax brackets, who are interested only in
capital gains, may not bother to try to get it.
At low interest rates the proportion of people
who will take the trouble to get time deposit
interest in the circumstances under discussion
is low. As rates rise, the proportion willing to
take the trouble will rise and this will tend to
shift funds (in relative terms) from demand
deposits to time deposits.
A SUMMARY AND A MODEL. My conclusions
on the relation of liquid assets to income, in-
terest rate, and interest rate differentials may
be summarized in the following way.20 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
i.Composition of portfolios. Persons whose
total financial assets are relatively small will
tend to hold them all in liquid form because
the differential return from other forms of
financial assets is too small to make the addi-
tional effort required worthwhile, and because
the probability of occurrence of a situation re-
quiring conversion of a large proportion of
financial assets to cash is high.
Persons with larger portfolios of financial
assets will divide them between liquid and non-
liquid assets.The proportion held in liquid
form will tend to increase if confidence in the
stability of income deteriorates, if the differ-
ential between the expected net yield on non-
liquid assets and that on liquid assets de-
creases, if the variance of the expected yield
on nonhiquid assets increases, if the ratio of
total assets to income decreases. In particular,
an improvement in confidence will tend to
raise the value of stocks in relation to income
and reduce the need for protective liquidity,
thus tending to reduce the ratio of liquid as-
sets to total financial assets. A change in the
differential between mortgage high-grade
bond yields will —ifit persists long enough to
be reflectedinsavings institution yields —
tendto cause a redistribution between holdings
of savings deposits and near-liquid assets like
high-grade bonds.
Since savings deposit yields move slowly, the
differential between savings deposit yields and
bond yields will reflect short-term movements
of bond yields. A cyclical increase in bond
yields tends to draw funds from liquid assets
to bonds, and vice versa.
2.Liquid assets in relation to income. For
a given state of confidence, relation of total
financial assets to income, and given interest
rate differentials, we should expect the liquid.
asset holdings of persons with relatively large
financial assets to grow from cycle to cycle in
rough proportion to income.
For persons with relatively small totalfi-
nancial assets, our expectation about the liquid
asset-income ratio is less clear.If changes in
the liquid asset-income ratio do not influence
the savings ratio then, over a decade in which
the growth rate of income is above average, the
ratio of liquid assets to income for small as-
set holders should tend to fall.But, because
the gross financial savings ratio varies not
only with the total savings ratio but also with
the amount of net investment in housing equity
and the net flow of consumer credit, we can-
not reach any very clear conclusion on the
probable movements of the ratio of liquid as-
sets to income for persons with small portfolios.
We cannot, therefore, attach any great signif-
icance to observed movements in the ratio of
liquid assets to income.
3. Money holdings versus liquid asset hold-
ings. In general, we expect that as the yields
on savings deposits rise, the proportion of liquid
assets held in the form of demand deposits
willdecline.However, the relationship be-
tween interest rates and the distribution of
liquid assets between demand and savings de-
posits will differ, as between different classes
of people and as between assets held for dif-
ferent purposes.Finally, it should be noted
that the yield on savings deposits should be
interpreted to represent not only the rate of
interest or dividend paid, but also the whole
cdmplexofadvertising andsellingefforts
which may induce people to shift from demand
to time deposits.
The whole position may be summarized in
terms of a few very simple equations. Let us
first divide households into high-asset and low-
asset households.Low-asset households hold
all financial assets in liquid form. One part
of their liquid assets is held for purposes di-
rectly related to income and these "transac-
tions" holdings are proportional to income; the
remainder is a residual.The proportion of
transactions assets held in the form of demand
deposits is a decreasing function of a moving
averageofsavingsdepositinterestrates
(strictly speaking, separate rates for different
types of institutions and different locations
should be used —asingle rate is used only as
a shorthand device). The proportion of the
residual liquid assets held in demand deposit
form is also a decreasing function of savings
deposit rates.In general, since the residual
balances are by definition not needed for near-
term outlays, a smaller proportion of those
balances will be held in demand deposit form
than the proportion of transactions balances.The change in liquid assets of the low-asset
group over any time period equals the gross
financial saving of the group during the period
=GFSL.
For the high-asset group, the same considera-
tions govern the division of liquid assets be-
tween demand deposits and others, except that
we should add a factor to allow for the asset
transactions demand for liquid assets and elim-
inate the residual element.
The final term is really another kind of asset
float which arises from the fact that persons
who normally make little use of savings de-
posits will take some time to shift from demand
deposits to savings deposits, if they should ac-
cumulate liquid funds as a result of a decline in
the attractiveness of securities.
The variable WFH will vary in proportion to
income if the share of property income, valua-
tion factors, and the concentration of income
remain constant.
Gross financial saving for the higher-income
groups should not be much influenced by varia-
tions in consumer credit or net investment in
residential property but may show some tend-
ency to rise when income rises rapidly. How-
ever, it would take us too far afield to discuss
that point here.
Movements of House/told Holdings of Liquid
Assets and Money in the Postwar Period.
It is clear that if (i) the ratio of wealth to
income, (2) yields on nonliquid assets and on
savings deposits and thesize distribution
of wealth are all constant, the ratio of demand
deposits to income will tend to be constant ex-
cept for minor fluctuations resulting from var-
iations in the ratio of gross financial savings to
income.
If the other conditions are satisfied while
savings deposit yields have an upward trend,
there will be a downward trend in the ratio of
demand deposits to income.
Now suppose that there are short-run varia-
tions in interest rates as a result of changes in
monetary policy and changes in economic ac-
tivity. A fall in investment activity will be ac-
companied by a decline in corporate retained
earnings and a rise in government deficit.In
mild depressions such as we have had in the
postwar period, there is little decline in gross
financial saving. Changes in required reserve
ratios make it possible for banks to bid for
securities and drive down interest rates to in-
duce households to reduce their purchases of
securities and increase holdings of both de-
mand and time deposits. When disposable in-
come remains constant, the residual liquid as-
sets of those with small portfolios will also rise
and some part of this will take the form of
demand deposits.
Of course, households, who withdraw from
or are pushed out of marketable securities,
Thus
THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH 2 I
DDL = AyL + (LL —AyL),where
DDL =demanddeposits of low-asset holders
F=amoving average of savings deposit yields
yL=theincome of the low-asset group
when
DDH = Ay" + (F) X D3 (rM —r')WHF + —
DDH =demandbalances of high-asset holders
y11=incomeof high-asset holders
WFH =totalfinancial wealth of high-asset holders
rM net expected yield on marketable securities.
The question of permanent income arises here. When
an individual's income declines and he remains a positive
saver, he may keep his working cash balance unchanged,
out of force of habit.If he becomes a negative saver (in
cash-flow terms) he must draw down liquid assets and I
should be inclined to think he would draw down his cash
balance because he holds it to absorb fluctuations in ex-
penditure relative to income. If aggregate income falls, we
shall have three groups of people: (i)thosewhose incomes
are unchanged and who, other things equal, keep cash
balances unchanged; (2)thosewhose incomes fall but who
remain positive cash savers —iftheir cash balances do not
fall, the ratio of cash balances to current income rises —
thepermanent income factor; those whose incomes fall
and who become negative savers, draw down cash balances
absolutely and relativelytoincome.The bufferstock
factors 2and3 affect the ratio of cash balances to income
in opposite directions.For simplicity I have written the
equation as though the two effects cancel out.22 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
shift their funds into savings deposits as well
as into demand deposits (indeed, in the post-
war period the increase in the flow into time
deposits in recession years has been consider-
ably greater than the increase in the flow of
household funds into demand deposits). Since
savings institutions hold little cash (unless we
count reserve absorption by commercial-bank
time deposits as the equivalent of cash), these
funds come right back into the market and
draw securities away from households.4 How-
ever, after a time, savings institutions begin
taking mortgages on new houses and the in-
crease in economic activity increases the trans-
actions demand for cash.
Households go into cash and time deposits
when interest rates fall, partly because bond
yields are low relative to savings deposits
yields, and partly because they expect a re-
covery and higher yields in the future. Some
households, of course, speculate for a capital
gain from a continued fall in interest rates,
hoping to get out before the recovery. They,
however, are usually bank financed and there-
fore merely supplement the demand for bonds
generated by the expansion of bank reserves.
The process described above for the down-
swing works in reverse on the upswing, though
not in an entirely symmetrical way.Rising
levels of income will increase transactions bal-
ance requirements for liquidity, but a con-
tinued upward trend in the moving average of
savings deposit rates works to lower the pro-
portion of such balances held in demand de-
posit form. The same considerations apply to
the effects of increasing total wealth. Thus, in
the absence of a change in the level of yields
on marketable securities, demand deposit hold-
ings of households are likely to grow at a
slower rate than income. A rise in household
purchases of securities, associated with a rise
in yields on marketable securities, may reduce
both time and demand balances held as part
of the asset float.
It seems to me that the analysis given above
does conform fairly well to the actual experi-
ence of the postwar period. The ratio of total
liquidity to personal income has shown no
'Secondary market purchases of mortgages from FNMA
reduce federal issues of securities and, therefore, reduce the
amount available for households.
trend since 1952. Total liquidity (as defined
here) has risen relative to income in recession
years and fallen in booms. There has been a
fairly obvious trade-off between time deposits
and high-grade bonds —e.g.,the "magic fives."
The proportion of household liquidity in the
form of currency and demand deposits has
fallen steadily since 1952.
Movements of Household Liquidity and De-
mand for Money in the Prewar Period.
Total household liquidity remained a fairly
constant proportion of personal income from
1922 to 1927 but fell rapidly during 1928 and
1929. The decline may be attributed to the
large volume of new security issues floated and
the general belief in the prospect of high net
yields from investment in common stocks.
The level of liquidity in relation to personal
income was lower (varying about a ratio of
.6) than in the years since 1952 when the
ratio of household liquid asset holdings to per-
sonal income has varied about a figure of
Someof the difference may be merely defini-
tional since the treatment of high-grade bonds
as an element in household liquidity is some-
what ambiguous. In addition, changes in in-
come distribution have probably increased the
share of financial saving by low-income groups
who tend (for reasons given above) to hold all
their financial assets in liquid form.
The most interesting and puzzling thing
about the twenties is the steady reduction in
the share of liquid assets held in the form of
demand deposits and currency.In 1922,38
per cent of household liquid asset holdings took
the form of currency and demand deposits. By
1927 the proportion held in those forms had
fallen to 30 per cent and by 1929 a further
fall to 25 per cent had taken place. The sharp
decline in household holdings of cash from
1927 to 1928 may be attributed to the rapid
flow of household funds into common stocks.
The furious pace of stock market activity re-
sulted in a sharp reduction of the "asset float."
The decline in relative cash holdings in the
earlier years is more difficult to explain.It
was not due to rising yields on savings deposits
because those yields were not rising. There is,
however, some reason to believe that at least
part of the shift resulted from changes in theTHE PORTFOLIO APPROACH 23
competitive position of national banks with
respect to time deposits. The establishment of
differential reserve ratios for time deposits in
1914 and the widening of national bank mort-
gage lending powers, together with the strength
of the demand for mortgages in the early
1920's, made time-deposit business attractive
to commercial banks. It was generally believed
during the 1920's that commercial banks en-
couraged customers to switch from demand
to time deposits and even permitted checking
against time deposits. It seems perfectly pos-
sible that increased nonprice competition for
time deposits resulted in some redistribution
of liquid assets between demand and time de-
posits.It is also possible that there was some
shift from Liberty bonds to time deposits as a
result of the decline in bond prices in 1920.
Since we did not include those bonds in liquid
assets, a switch from bonds to time deposits
would reduce the ratio of demand deposits to
the liquid assets included in the ratios quoted
above.
Those explanations appear a little ad hoc and
the possibility of other explanations cannot be
ruled out.
During the decade of the thirties the ratio
of household liquid assets to personal income
reached the high figure of 74 per cent in 1932.
The ratio then fell almost continuously until,
by 1941, it had reached the 6o per cent level
which ruled during the middle 1920'S. It seems
reasonable to attribute the variation to changes
in confidence particularly in the early part of
the period.
The share of liquid assets held in the form
of demand deposits and currency rose through-
out the 1930's, reaching 40 per cent by 1941.
Since the yields offered for savings deposits de-
clined throughout the period, there seems to
be no special difficulty in explaining the rising
share of demand deposits and currency in total
liquidity.
Conclusions.
The household demand for liquid assets and
money is a complex matter which does not
seem to have a simple explanation. Without
repeating what has been said above we may
conclude that, putting aside short cycle move-
ments, the distribution of income and the ex-
tent of confidence in income stability are the
major factors determining the demand for
liquid assets in general. The distribution of liq-
uid assets between demand and time deposits is
significantly influenced by the efforts of savings
institutions —throughratecompetition and
other selling efforts —toobtain time deposits.
In the shorter cyclical movements, the vol-
ume of narrowly defined liquid assets held by
households varies considerably with the varia-
tion in the difference between rate of return on
time deposits and expected yield on marketable
securities. Demand deposits holdings are also
significantly affected by variations in expected
yields on marketable securities.
Although demand and time deposits are com-
petitive with one another, their short-run cy-
clical movements often tend to be positively
correlated.
Conclusions
In this paper I have tried to do two things:
(i) to review the major factors which seem
likely to influence the amount and composi-
tion of liquid assets held by households and
corporations; and (2) to examine the data over
the last forty years to see whether they can be
explained in terms of the factors discussed
under (i).
The major conclusions for corporations are
as follows:
(r) Short-runmovementsofcorporate
liquidity are strongly influenced by variations
in cash flow from operations —mostof these
variations are reflected in holdings of govern-
ment securities rather than in holdings of cash.
(2)Themovementoftotalcorporate
liquidity during the 1930's suggests a fairly
strong connection between business confidence
and ratio of liquid-asset holdings to activity.
Thedecline in the ratio of corporate
liquidity to sales in the years since 1952 is
partly attributable to the decline in tax li-
abilities but also to improved cash manage-
ment, and confidence in income stability.
(4) Corporate holdings of liquid assets re-
spond fairly strongly to short-run changes in
interest rates.
Thereis no indication that the division
of liquid assets between cash and other liquid24 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
assets responds to short-run changes in bill
rates.
(6) After allowance for the effect of chang-
ing tax liabilities, there has been only a slight
downward trend in the proportion of liquid as-
sets held in cash. The rise in interest rates
since 1952 therefore appears to have had little
effect. However, it may be that improvements
in cash management have been due to rising
interest rates, while reduction in liquidity in
other forms was due to improved confidence.
In that case, changing interest rates may have
had some influence on the distribution of liquid
assets.
(7) During the depression of the thirties the
proportion of liquid assets held in cash did rise
as interest rates fell.It therefore appears that
the elasticity of cash holdings to interest rates
is greater at low interest-rate levels than at
high ones.
The conclusions with regard to households
can be summarized as follows:
Short-run movements of household liquidity
show considerable response to short-run changes
in net expected yields in marketable securities.
A large part of this response is reflected in time-
deposit holdings but demand deposits also
respond.
Total liquid asset holdings responded to
changes in confidence during the 1930's in the
same way that corporate holdings did.
The division of liquid asset holdings between
cash and time deposits appears to have respond-
ed to changes in yields on savings deposits and





James Duesenberry in his encyclopedic cov-
erage of the movements of holdings of cash and
of liquid assets has listed many factors, but
three elements appear and reappear: increasing
returns to scale in transactions (whether be-
tween cash and other liquid assets or between
liquid and nonliquid assets); the conveniences
of having cash (and, by derivation, the con-
veniences of liquidity in terms of ease of ac-
quiring cash as needed); and risk aversion.I
will state some results in theory of choice under
uncertainty which bear on the more precise
interpretation of these elements and their im-
plications for behavior.
Two branches of the theory of choice under
uncertainty will be drawn on here: stochastic
multiperiod inventory theory and the theory
of risk aversion.
Implications of Inventory Theory
There has developed in the last fifteen years
a theory of optimal behavior for the holding of
inventories, where the firm is facing repeated
uncertain demands and has repeated opportuni-
ties to purchase inventories.' In its simplest
'SeeP.Masse, Les reserves et Ia regulation de l'avenir,
Paris, Hermann & Cie., 1946;K.J. Arrow, T. E. Harris,
form, we assume discrete time periods. At the
beginning of each period, the firm has a given
stock of inventory. It is then faced with a de-
mand, which is a drawing from a probability
distribution. The demand is met, at least to the
extent possible, and there is a penalty for the
shortfall, if any. The firm then places an order
for as much more stock as it wishes, and the new
order, plus whatever stock may have been left
over after meeting the demand, constitutes the
stock on hand at the beginning of the next
period. The cost for the period is the sum of
the penalty and the ordering cost (plus possibly
also storage cost); this is a random variable,
since both the penalty and the amount ordered
may depend on the random demand. The aim
of policy is to minimize the sum over time of
discounted expected costs.
Two observations may be made on these
assumptions. In the first place, since only the
expected value of returns is considered, we are
assuming risk neutrality. This is an assumption
appropriate for a large corporation, where the
risk is divided and, in general, small for each
stockholder relative to his total wealth, but not
for an individual.
and J. Marschak, "Optimal Inventory Policy," Econometrica,
19(1955), pp. 250—I 72; K.J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and H. Scarf,
Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Pro-
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In the second place, the whole problem arises
because goods cannot be procured instanta-
neously, at least not without extra cost. If stock,
could be ordered after the demand is known,
there would be no costs beyond the irreducible
minimum for ordering the goods. One interpre-
tation of the penalty is the price of immediate
delivery of the goods, which is higher than the
ordering cost for lagged delivery. The differ-
ence between the penalty and ordering costs is
a form of transaction cost, which we may term
a timed transaction cost.
The interpretation of the inventory model
relevant for the present discussion is that in
which the good in question is cash or possibly
liquid assets, and the firm is subject to random
demands for cash, which cannot be replenished
immediately without additionalcost.2The
optimal policy depends on the nature of the
ordering cost function. If cash can be obtained
at a cost proportional to the magnitude de-
manded (constant marginal cost), the optimal
policy is to set a target level of cash and then,
in each period,afterthe demand, acquire
enough cash to bring the stock up to the target
level. The target level depends on the penalty
for shortfall, the rate of interest (which is the
penalty for excessive holdings of cash), and
the probability distribution of demand. The
fluctuationintheobserved cashholdings,
especially if the observation is made just after
the demand has occurred,willindeed,as
Duesenberry notes, reflect primarily the fluc-
tuations in demand. However, the target may
change because of changes in the rate of inter-
est;it may also change because of changes in
the subjective probability distribution of de-
mands, which in turn may be influenced by the
observations.The latter movement will be
relatively slow, since conviction of a change in
the probability distribution will only be ob-
tained after a series of observations confirm it.
A second case is that in which the ordering
cost contains a fixed component as well as a
proportional one. However, the ordering cost
is zero if no order is placed. This corresponds
The model analyzed by D. Patinkin (in Money, Inter-
est, and Prices, Evanston, Illinois, Row, Peterson, 1956,
Ch. VII)is similar to a one-period version of the above
model; there may be a whole sequence of demands and
payments at random times within a period in which no cash
replenishment at all can be carried out.
to a psychic cost of decision making or to ad-
ministrative cost or to some other form of
economies of scale in handling cash. This is
again a transaction cost but of a different kind
from timed transaction costs; we may call it a
fixed transaction cost, in that it does not depend
on the magnitude of the transaction.3
The optimal policy here is of the two-bin or
S,s type, to use the terms in the literature.
There are two levels, a target, S, and a reorder
point, 5; cash is acquired only if reserves fall
below s, but when they do, enough cash is ac-
quired to bring the stock up to S.4 As can be
seen, this implies a stickiness in the response to
falling cash reserves; only beyond a certain
level is there a response, but the response is apt
to be large.The difference, S —s,which is
roughly the size of the order (actually the order
is usually somewhat larger), is under certain
conditions roughly proportional to the square
root of mean cash demands.
Risk Aversion
In this section, I will assume the absence of
transaction costs and consider the effects on the
demands for cash and for liquid assets of risk
aversion. The model is a modified form of that
studied by Tobin.5 It is basically a study of the
choice between risky and safe assets; in inter-
pretation it is perhaps more suited to analysis
of the margin between liquid and nonliquid
assets than between cash and liquid assets,
since transactions motives are more significant
in the latter choice.
We use the expected-utility hypothesis of
behavior under uncertainty; that is, the individ-
ual makes choices so asto maximize the
expected value of a suitably chosen utility
function for wealth. One implication of the
expected-utility hypothesis is not always under-
8The distinction between transaction costs which depend
on the magnitude of the transaction and those which do not
appears (in a nonstochastic context) in J. Tobin, "Interest-
Elasticity of Transactions Demand for Cash," Review of
Economics and Stetistics, 38, 1956, pp. 24r—247.
'Although the policy had been discussed a good deal in
the literature, the first proof of the optimality of the S s
policy under reasonably general conditions is due to my
colleague, H. Scarf, "The Optimality of the (S, s) Policies
in the Dynamic Inventory Problem," in K. J. Arrow, S.
Karlin, and P. Suppes, Mathematical Methods in the Social
Sciences, 'p59, Stanford University Press, 2960, pp. 296—202.
5J. Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward
Risk," Review of Economic Studies, 26, 1958, pp.26 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
stood; the utility function must be bounded,
for otherwise a version of the St. Petersburg
paradox could be found (this point was origi-
nally developed by the mathematician, Karl
Menger).If X is wealth and U(X) is the
utility function, then we suppose, of course,
that U(X) isstrictly increasing; from the
boundedness, it must approach a finite upper
limit as X approaches infinity and a finite lower
limit as X approaches zero. From the first of
these, it is clear that on the average there must
be risk aversion, i.e., U"(X) (the second deriva-
tive) must be negative except, at most, for
isolated intervals. It will be assumed here that
individuals are risk averters throughout.
The quantity U"(X) is not itself a suitable
measure of risk aversion, since it depends on the
units in which utility is measured. Two meas-
ures will be used here: (i) relative risk aver-
sion, defined as —XU"(X)/U'(X), which is
also the elasticity of the marginal utility of in-
come, and (2) absolute risk aversion, defined
as —U"(V)/U'(X). The first will be the more
important.
The boundedness of the utility function has
the following consequence; the relative risk
aversion must approach a limit greater than i
as X approaches infinity, and a limit less than
i as X approaches zero.(This may be made
clearer by noting that the logarithmic utility
function, which is unbounded at both ends, has
a relative risk aversion constantly equal to i.)
If, for simplicity, we assume that the relative
risk aversion is monotonic, then it must be
monotonic increasing. In a sense, safety is a
luxury good.
The choice model isthat introduced by
Tobin; the notation differs somewhat. Let A
be the initial wealth of the individual. He can
invest all or some with a random rate of return
R; the remainder, he leaves in cash with a
certain rate of return of zero. The model can
easily be extended to the case where there is a
secure asset with a positive rate of return; in
that case R is interpreted as the difference be-
tween the random and the secure rates. This
interpretation applies to the choice between
liquid and risky assets. Let a be the amount
invested. Then the wealth at the end o.f the
period is,
a(z +R)+(A —a) =A +aR,
and the individual seeks to maximize,
E[U(A + aR)],
where a must lie between 0 and A. It can be
shown that the optimal investment a is neces-
sarily positive if and only if E(R) is positive;
an individual will always take some part of a
favorable risk but, if a risk averter, will never
take any part of an unfair risk. The optimum
might involve investing the entire initial wealth.
If it does not, the optimal investment satisfies
the condition,
E[U'(A + aR) R] =o.
We are interested in the demand for risky
investment, a, and its complement, m =A—a,
the demand for cash or liquid assets. First, we
consider the effects of initial wealth A. If ab-
solute risk aversion is increasing, then it can be
shown that a decreases as A increases, that
risky investment is an inferior good. Since this
result is certainly empirically implausible, we
must reject the hypothesis of increasing abso-
lute risk aversion. It may be noted that the
quadratic utility function, often used for its
simplicity,impliesincreasing absoluterisk
aversion and so must be rejected.If, on the
other hand, we assume decreasing absolute risk
aversion, then risky investment becomes a
normal good.
Decreasing relative risk aversion, which is
a natural assumption, as we have seen, has a
very interesting implication; the wealth elas-
ticity of the demand for cash or liquid assets
is greater than i, so that money and liquid
assets areluxuries.Although thedetailed
empirical meaning of this implication requires
further examination, particularly because of
the neglect of transaction costs, it corresponds
to the empirical work of Friedman and of
Selden.°
These results have referred to wealth effects;
one might also ask about price effects. Under
uncertainty, the analogue of a price is the
probability distribution of R and, of course,
there are many possible ways a distribution can
change. A simple upward shift by a constant
0Friedman,"The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical
and Empirical Results," Journal of Political Economy, 67,
2959,pp.327—352; R. T. Selden, "Monetary Velocity in the
United States," in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,
M. Friedman, Ed., University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp.
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amount(i.e.,the mean increases while the
distributionaboutthemean remainsun-
changed) can be shown to increase the demand
•for risky investment, as might be expected,
provided that risky investment is a normal
good. It may be noted that an increase in the
rate of interest on the secure asset implies a
downward shiftin thedistributionof the
spread, R, and so, again as might be expected,
an increase in the demand for liquid assets.
A second type of shift in the distribution of
R is a simple multiplicative shift around zero.
Here we have the simple and surprising result
presented by Tobin; the risky investment is
reduced in inverse proportion to the multiplier.
Thus an ideal proportional income tax at rate
t,whichmeans a multiplier of i —t, willin-
crease investment in risky assets in the pro-
portion, i/(i —t).
Finally,we can consider a multiplicative
shift around the mean instead of around zero,
which might be thought of as a pure change in
dispersion.This can be regarded as a com-
pounding of the two previous shifts, a multi-
plication around zero, followed by an additive
shift to restore the mean to its original value.
It follows that an increase in dispersion, in this
sense, will reduce the demand for risky invest-
ment (and increase that for liquid assets), pro-
vided that risky investment is a normal good.
PHILLIP CAGAN,
Brown University
With James Duesenberry's paper as back-
ground, I should like to review what we know
about the interest elasticity of monetary veloc-
ity in the short run.Several years ago the
widespread belief that this elasticity might be
very high led to strong misgivings about the
effectiveness of monetary policy. This was one
of the questions the Commission on Money and
Credit was to deal with. It did not, at least not
clearly. So I appoint myself to a commission
of one to issue a supplementary report on this
question.
The issue, you will remember, was whether
changes in velocity owing to interest-rate move-
ments induced by open market operations might
largely offset the effect of those operations and
so prevent the Federal Reserve from restraining
booms and mitigating recessions. The Radcliffe
Report seems to suggest that the interest elas-
ticity of velocity might be infinite, because of
a ready supply of money substitutes, so that
monetary measures are trapped in a swamp of
unlimited liquidity.This extreme view was
heard much less in this country after our tight
money period in 1955—56. The view still pre-
vails that velocity changes can delay or subdue
monetary measures though not offset them
entirely.
Some defenders of monetary measures argued
that such changes in velocity are welcome be-
cause they cushion the shock of monetary
restraint.This is an ingenious counterattack
but very misleading. We do not need this ad-
ditionalcushion;the economy hasothers.
Those who need to borrow can always do so
if they are willing to pay the going rate. To be
sure, an elastic velocityisin a sense the
market's way of softening the blow of monetary
restraint.Accordingly, if velocity were com-
pletely inelastic, we should not feel deprived of
a needed safety valve; the inelasticity of veloc-
ity would indicate that we did not need the
valve. On this argument we might conclude
that it doesn't matter how elastic velocity is.
An elastic velocity may cause problems, how-
ever. The timing, extent, and duration of in-
duced changes in velocity may be difficult to
predict and so make the effects of a given
monetary action uncertain beforehand.This
surely does not make it easier to stabilize the
economy by monetary measures and may make
it more difficult.I say "may" because changes
in velocity occur frequently for many other
reasons, and this additional source of change
may not make monetary stabilization any more
difficult than it would otherwise be. In statis-
tical terms, the standard error of predictions of
future changesinvelocity may be larger
(though not necessarily) when the interest
elasticity of velocity is larger.
What does the evidence show about the size
of this elasticity?Duesenberry is imprecise
about the effects of interest rates on the de-
mand for checking deposits, as he has to be in
the kind of historical survey he presents. If I
do not misread him, however, interest effects
play a secondary role in his analysis, and this
is so for periods in which the size of their move-28 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
ments was among the sharpest on record. He
finds little reason for, and little evidence of,
interest-rate effects on corporate cash balances,
at least in the short run. For households, in-
terest rates on savings deposits are important,
though they are likely to have their main effects
in the long run, both because households may
adjust savings deposits slowly to changes in
these rates and because these rates respond
slowly to changes in bond rates. This all ap-
pears plausible to me from the data I have
examined. He finds the main short-run effect
of interest rates on demand deposits to be that
of bond rates on the deposits of high-asset
households, and even this effect is subdued be-
cause many of the households who move in and
out of bonds probably keep their idle balances
in savings accounts.
I come away from Duesenberry's paper,
therefore, with the impression that the interest
elasticity of velocity in the short run is not very
high, or at least is likely to be much lower than
in the long run. Perhaps he did not intend to
give this impression; in any event, I see nothing
in the evidence he covers to deny it and much
to support it.
How do such findings square with other
studies? We have first of all Henry Latané's
well-known study showing an impressive long-
run relationship between velocity and interest
rates since i 909. This study and others similar
to it raised doubts in my mind, because they
seemed to depend heavily on two large move-
ments in velocity and interest rates from the
1930's to the 1950'S without any indication that
theshorter movements withinthisperiod
showedthesamerelationship.Moreover,
Latané's data do not appear to fit so well be-
fore World War I. Friedman's results suggest
that long swings in velocity can be explained
just as well by permanent income, though, as
he indicates, his results may not be inconsistent
with Latané's because of their different treat-
ment of time deposits and also because per-
manent income may be a proxy for changes in
interest rates.' My colleague Allan Meltzer
reports a good fit of real cash balances to in-
If y r "the"
interest rate, W real national wealth, and pdenotes"per-
manent" magnitudes), a change in rp will affect y,,ifit
reflects a change in productivity of capital, and will affect
if a change in the public's desire to hold wealth.
terest rates for the entire period since 1900
using a concept of wealth instead of income as
a deflator of money balances. When he uses
permanent income as a deflator, he also gets a
significantpartialregressioncoefficientfor
interest rates, and does so for the period before
1930.
These results suggest that there is an effect
of interest rates on velocity in the long run.
They are less clear, to me at least, on whether
there is an effect in the short run.Scatter
diagrams may show a short-run correlation to
some degree, but this may be spurious, reflect-
ing the tendency of velocity and interest rates
to respond in a similar way to fluctuations in
business activity.These correlationstudies
seem togive more consistentresultsover
longer periods than over individual cycles and
for long-term rather than short-term rates of
interest, though these points need further clari-
fication.
I may cite evidence of quite a different kind.
In a study I made of seven hyperinflations,2 I
found a lagged relation between velocity and
the cost of holding money, where the cost in
this case was the rate of change of prices. The
lag was of the distributed type and had average
lengths of nearly a year or more in most
countries; moreover, the length appeared to
decrease with the extent and duration of hyper-
inflation.If this evidence is carried over to
normal times and applied to the effect of inter-
est rates on velocity, the implication is that the
effect has an average lag of several years or
more.
My study, Duesenberry's paper, and other
evidence I have seen appear to suggest that the
short-runinterestelasticityofvelocityis
smaller than the long-run elasticity. In Melt-
zer's study, the long-run elasticity is approxi-
mately unity, so the short-run elasticity may be
considerably less than unity, depending on the
time span. If so, cyclical fluctuations in veloc-
ity are not to be attributed to interest-rate
movements, at least not entirely.Although
there may be many serious obstacles to effective
monetary measures, such as lags, poor fore-
casts of business conditions, and so on, off-
'In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Milton
Friedman, Ed., University of Chicago Press,THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH 29




The description in this interesting paper by
Duesenberry of the procedures followed in ar-
riving at the conclusions given does not seem to
me to be adequate to form an appraisal either
of the approach followed or of the degree of
success achieved.It is not entirely clear, for
example, how the supply of liquid assets has
been handled in his model nor how much varia-
tion he has been able to explain in what are
apparently presumed to be demand relation-
ships for liquid assets by corporations and
households. I assume that this information will
be forthcoming, but until it is, I can comment
only on some of the specifics of the paper rather
than on the more important general orientation.
The paper incidentally would be made more
useful by presentation of the basic data and key
statistics, so that qualitative conclusions can
be assessed and also comparisons with other
findings can be effected.
In his discussion of short-run movements in
corporateliquidity, Duesenberry findsthat
variations in corporate liquid assets are prin-
cipally due to variations in cash flows from
operations and only to a lesser extent to inter-
est rates. There is no indication of any treat-
ment of the influence of the level of current
liabilities on liquid-asset holdings except for a
constant percentage tax adjustment. It is not
at all clear why tax liabilities are treated in
this unique fashion and why the level as well
as composition of other current liabilities is not
considered to influence corporate liquidity, par-
•ticularly since business firms are supposed to
use the liquid asset —currentliability ratio as
one important measure ofliquidity.More
It is sometimes also argued that even a "low" interest
elasticity of velocity is troublesome if the interest elasticity of
investment is sufficiently low. Then a large change in interest
rates is required to produce a given change in investment
and, with even a low interest elasticity of velocity, an ex-
ceptionally large open market operation is required.It is
further argued that a large operation may not be feasible for
"institutional" reasons, but these reasons have never been
dearly specified.Unless they refer to lags and the conse-
quent danger of overshooting,itis hard to take them
seriously.
generally, of course, the whole current and
fixed-asset and liability structure would be ex-
pected to be relevant. The answer may be that
Duesenberry has been able to explain virtually
all variation in liquidity by the variables he has
used, but this seems doubtful and in any case
cannot be ascertained from his paper.
While apparently the corporate-bond yield
is considered as one of the determinants of
liquid-asset holdings of corporations, there is
no indication that the cost of equity financing
or the state of the equity markets has been
considered in any systematic form. Thus, for
example, it is not entirely clear why the 1952—
6r rise in Baa bond yields might be expected to
be associated with a decline in corporate liquid-
ity, since presumably most firms would have
considered that that rise in bond yields was
associated with a sizable decline in the cost of
equityfinancing.Also, when Duesenberry
notes that "a one percentage point increase in
the bond yield appears to reduce corporate
borrowing by $700 million per quarter," would
not that rise in bond yields result in a partly
offsetting increase in equity financing, even
without any further adjustment for the fact that
the cost of equity financing would normally be
considered by business to be declining when
interest rates are rising?
Duesenberry finds that the ratio of corporate
liquidity to GNP during the twenties was higher
than in the fifties.It is not clear whether he is
relating corporate liquidity to GNP, as he
states, or to income originating in the corporate
sector which would appear to be more appro-
priate. However, the latter measure of corpo-
rate liquidity might even intensify the result he
obtained. Duesenberry notes that the changes
in the cost of liquidity or in confidence about
income stability cannot be used to explain the
difference in liquidity ratios between the two
periods.I would not be inclined to discount
completely the possibility that business in re-
cent years has been appreciably less concerned
about the danger of major depression than it
was in the twenties. Three other factors which
might help to explain at least part of the dif-
ference in liquidity between the two periods are,
first and most important, the much greater
burden of debt in the twenties; second, perhaps
greater access to or willingness to use short-30 THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH
term bank financing, or both, in the fifties, at
least in manufacturing; and third, perhaps the
difference in the implications of tax liabilities.
SinceIjustreceived Duesenberry's paper
shortly before this conference, I have not had
an opportunity to look into the relevant debt
statistics, but I do recall that the ratio of inter-
est payments to income before taxes and before
interest was about 25 per cent in the late
twenties and is perhaps one-half that currently,
which might suggest a situation calling for
higher liquidity in the earlier period. So far as
the tax situation is concerned, it is not clear
what tax adjustment was made or should have
been in the twenties as compared with the
fifties, but it is possible that the procedure fol-
lowed might have distorted the comparison of
liquidity ratios in the two periods. On the
other hand, there are several possible reasons
for expecting a lower conventional liquidity
ratio in the twenties, including the influence of
call loans and commercial paper.
Another question relating to the adjustment
for tax liability relates to the discussion of the
trend in relative importance of cash versus
other forms of corporate liquid assets in the
postwar period. Assuming, for want of infor-
mation, that a constant percentage adjustment
was made for tax liability, would this be appro-
priate over a period in the earlier part of which
corporate tax payments due at the end of a year
could be paid over the following year as a
whole, while at the end of the period such tax
payments had to be made in the first half of the
following year?
Duesenberry also states in his discussion of
the composition of corporate liquid assets that
"no one has found a statistically significant
relationship between short-term variations in
bill yields and the distribution of corporate
liquiditybetweencash and governments."
Though this statement may very well be true,
I am surprised at such a finding. In a paper,
"The Effects of Monetary Policies on Non-
monetary Financial Institutions and Capital
Markets," I prepared for the Commission on
Money and Credit, in which I analyzed the
demand for and supply of claims on different
financialinstitutions,but without generally
separating corporations from households,I
found a highly significant effect, in the expected
direction, of quarterly changes in the bill rate
on the demand for idle demand deposits by the
private sector, and also on the demand for
federal securities by this sector. I would have
guessed that this result reflected in good part
a corporate response to changes in bill rates.
Turning to the discussion of household de-
mand for liquid assets and for demand deposits,
Duesenberry notes that such demand might be
expected to increase with permanent income
and discusses some theoretical possibilities of
different types of response to changes in income.
A considerable body of seemingly relevant sur-
vey data on the relation of household asset
structure and savingtodifferent types of
changes in income exists and perhaps might
be used.To give one such finding:".
familieswithfluctuatingincomes(over a
three-year period) do not seem to show much
differencefrom familieswith constantin-
comes in their saving in the form of cash and
deposits; there appears to be some tendency
for the former to save less in cash and deposits
than the latter at all income levels, though at
high income levels families with fluctuating in-
comes might be expected from theoretical con-
siderations to accumulate more cash and de-
posits than families with constant incomes." 1
In his interesting attempt to estimate asset
float as a significant element in accounting for
the level of personal demand deposits, Duesen-
berry notes that a large proportion of the more
substantial personal demand deposit accounts
is held in connection with financial transactions
and approximates at "a rough guess individual
purchases and sales of stocks, bonds, real estate,
and other assets amount to something like $ioo
billion per year." This seems much too small,
which would suggest that asset float is even
larger than estimated by Duesenberry, thus
strengthening his point, unless the average
holding period has been correspondingly over-
stated. In 1961 purchases plus sales of stock
alone amounted to billion and while a
sizable amount of this is broker-dealer or in-
stitutional, and 1961is considerably higher
than the average of preceding years, the house-
hold sector alone in recent years (excluding
1lrwin Friend and Stanley Schor, Consumption and
Saving, Vol. II, University of Pennsylvania Press,1960,
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broker-dealers and institutions) must have had
an average amount of stock purchases plus
sales of well over $ioo billion in 1961andper-
haps $75 billion annually in the late 1950's. I
have not had the opportunity to make a rough
estimate of the other items, but my guess is
that they amount to very much more than $25
billion.I am assuming, incidentally, though
Duesenberry does not make clear where he
treats the demands of financial institutions,
that they are not included in the household
sector; otherwise the apparent understatement
of float would be more serious. The figure for
gross financial transactions of the household
sector is of course the least unreliable of the
estimates required to derive asset float in the
form of demand deposits. Duesenberry notes
that the sharp decline in household holdings of
cash in the late twenties may be attributed to a
sharp reduction of asset float associated with the
"furious" pace of the stock market. This seems
questionable in view of the enormous increase
in the volume of stock and other financial trans-
actions even if there were an appreciable re-
duction in the average holding period between
the sale of one asset and the purchase of
another.
In the one place in his paper where Duesen-
berry does present an explicit model, i.e., where
he discusses the determinants of money hold-
ings versus other liquid assets for the household
sector, it is not at all clear how a key financial
asset such as stock is supposed to affect demand
balances.It would appear that the market
value of stock enters as an exogenous explana-
tory variable for demand behavior of high-asset
holders but not at all for small-asset holders.
Liabilities and real assets apparently are pre-
sumed to have no effect on demand balances for
any group of asset holders. Insurance is ap-
parently assumed to have no effect on demand
behavior at least for low-asset holders. It is not
clear whether the yield variables are supposed
to be adjusted for expected price level changes,
where this is relevant, or how changes in risk
evaluationorinuncertainty arehandled.
Though gross financial saving is introduced as
a relevant variable in explaining demand de-
posits of high-asset households, Duesenberry
concludes that, other things being equal, there
will only be "minor fluctuations [in the ratio of
demand deposits to income]resulting from
variations in the ratio of gross financial savings
to income." This apparently means that the
coefficient of gross financial savings is very
small since such saving, assuming it is com-
prised of currency and deposits, savings shares
and securities, is quite variable in relation to
income.
So far as his general conclusions are con-
cerned, it is difficult to assess such statements
as, "...thedistribution of income and the
extent of confidence in income stability are the
major factors determining the [household] de-
mand for liquid assets in general," without
morebackgroundquantitativeinformation
than is supplied. Thus I was not able to com-
pare Duesenberry's interest rate effects on the
level and composition of liquid assets with re-
lated results reported in the CMC paper I
referred to earlier or with other results. How-
ever, qualitatively, his major conclusions for
the corporate and household sectors seem for
the most part to be reasonable.